OFFICIAL

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Summary	Report on the s163 RTA ethnicity recording pilot reviewing data and feedback and providing options (updated with appendix C)			
Author	Chief Inspector Owen Pyle			
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Authorised By	Detective Chief Superintendent Ella Marriott			

REPORT ON THE s163 ROAD TRAFFIC ACT ETHNICITY RECORDING PILOT (UPDATED WITH DATA ON s163/S&S and STAFF TIME IMPLICATIONS – SEE APPENDIX C BELOW)

Purpose

1. The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the pilot run by the Deputy Commissioner's Delivery Group and Roads and Transport Policing Command, to record the ethnic background of drivers stopped by police under s163 Road Traffic Act. It proposes a number of options as to next steps. It also suggests a series of recommendations should the pilot be further rolled-out across the MPS.

Options

- 2. The following options are for consideration (see far below for SWOT analysis):
 - Option 1: Take no further action nor amend MPS approach and do not roll out the pilot any further.
 - Option 2: Trial the pilot further with a variety of different commands, including MO7, VCTF and a selection of BCUs, to identify any potential blockers or issues beyond RTPC and test compliance with a broader pool of officers.
 - Option 3: Fully roll-out the pilot to all units across the MPS.
- 3. If the pilot is further rolled-out then the following recommendations are proposed:

Recommendation 1: Efforts should be made to socialise the pilot with frontline officers including face-to-face briefings and allowing them an opportunity to ask questions. This will encourage better compliance and reassure officers as to the purpose of the pilot.

Recommendation 2: The final version of the e-form used for the pilot should be used, including capturing officer-defined ethnicity for occasions where a driver declines to provide their ethnicity or it is not possible to identify their self-identified ethnicity (in line with HMICFRS recommendations).

Recommendation 3: Reason for and outcome of the stop should be recorded. This will demonstrate that, despite a legal power existing, most vehicle stops are not random, but initiated through intelligence, traffic offences or professional judgement leading to suspicion. It will also identify any possible disparities in choice of disposal.

Recommendation 4: Governance should be robust with nominated SPOCs on commands responsible for dip-sampling BWV and addressing non-compliance.

<u>Recommendation 5:</u> The MPS should liaise with the NPCC to ensure our position is consistent with other forces and considers the recommendations made in the most recent HMICFRS Disproportionality Report.

Background to the Pilot

- 4. The Road Traffic Act was passed by Parliament in 1988. s163 was included to replace identical powers given to the police to stop vehicles under s159 Road Traffic Act 1972 the only change was replacing 'motor vehicle' with 'mechanically propelled vehicle'. The earliest existence of this power is s20(3) Road Traffic Act 1930, which gave a police officer in uniform the power to stop any person driving a motor vehicle on a road. The act does not confer the automatic right to search a vehicle, therefore the direct correlation to PACE stop and search powers can be misleading.
- 5. Having researched Hansard, to understand any background to the power, its wideranging nature was supported by MPs. The Government at the time noted that concerns around the misuse of the power were mitigated by the introduction of s4 PACE, which made the requirement for superintendent authority, to set up road checks. MPs at the time also noted that officers often cannot see a driver before they stop them, which diminishes the likelihood of abuse. Parliament therefore set no requirements or restrictions on the police use of s163 Road Traffic Act.
- 6. The recording of the ethnicity of drivers stopped under s163 Road Traffic Act has been championed by the Mayor of London and this pilot has come about following the publication of the Mayor's Action Plan. The Mayor has also written to the Prime Minister, requesting that police forces are required to collect and publish data on the ethnicity of drivers stopped under s163 RTA.
- 7. In February 2021 HMICFRS released a report entitled 'Disproportionate use of police powers' in which they stated the MPS pilot to record ethnicity of s163 stops was a 'positive step'. They reiterated recommendations they made in a 2015 report, that all forces should have minimum recording standards for s163 stops, to ensure the power was used fairly and criticised forces for not having introduced this.
- 8. A number of other reports have criticised forces for not recording the ethnicity of drivers stopped under s163 and made recommendations that they should capture this, including the 2017 StopWatch & Liberty report 'Driving while black' and the London Policing Ethics Panel's 2017 report 'Police Encounters with the Public Second Report: Vehicle Stops'.

Pilot detail

- 9. The pilot ran for one week in every month from January to June 2021. It was delivered by the Roads Transport and Policing Command with support from the Deputy Commissioner's Delivery Group. The support of Superintendent NAME REDACTED, Inspector NAME REDACTED and PS NAME REDACTED from RTPC was crucial in ensuring its success.
- 10. The pilot was run within all Roads Policing Response Teams from the four geographical traffic garages. These are the traffic units that undertake proactive patrol of London's roads. The pilot did not include Safer Transport Teams who patrol the bus network.
- 11. Officers were instructed to ask the driver of every vehicle stopped under s163 Road Traffic Act to give their 'self-defined ethnicity' (SDE) and then complete an eform to record this, regardless of the stop outcome. For the final 2 months of the pilot, if no SDE was provided, 'officer defined ethnicity' (ODE) was recorded. Officers were given discretion as to whether to complete the e-form at the roadside or at a later point. There is no legal power to require drivers to provide their ethnicity so the pilot relied on driver consent and/or or the officer's interpretation of their ethnicity.

Challenges

- 12. Officer compliance with the pilot was mixed. This is evidenced by the variation in the number of stops recorded across each month. There was a noticeable dip in March and it cannot be said with confidence, that all vehicle stops by Roads Policing Teams were recorded. However the data is sufficiently robust to draw general conclusions.
- 13. Body Worn Video (BWV) from Roads Policing officers was dip sampled during and after each pilot week by the Delivery Group. While many officers were asking and recording ethnicity of drivers stopped, some were not. It has been noted previously in other reports that officers find it difficult asking for details of ethnicity, as it does not form part of a natural conversation and is an area where many are uncomfortable, both when asking and being asked.
- 14. However, it must be noted that SPOCs within RTPC made significant effort to engage officers and secure their buy-in, leading to a good return in Week 1 and a noticeable increase in recorded stops in Weeks 4 and 6. Nothing in this report should be read as criticism of the RTPC SPOCs.
- 15. The data captured evolved over the pilot period and therefore the data may not always be immediately comparable. However any future roll out can be based on the latest and most informed data collection position, so will be able to be directly comparable. The final version of the e-form is the version that is recommended for any future use. See **Appendix A**.

- 16. The pilot did not capture Roads Policing tasking areas during the period which could have an influence on ethnic background of those stopped e.g. certain areas may have more drivers from a specific ethnic background. Data capture may also be influenced by road layout and type, e.g. a motorway compared to a local high street.
- 17. This report uses comparator data from the Greater London Authority 2021 Population Projections collated in 2016. However it must be noted:
 - The ethnicity breakdown in these projections is not necessarily reflective of the population of London that hold driving licences. This data is not held by the DVLA.
 - The age of drivers may not necessarily reflect the overall age demographic of London.
 - The GLA data does not reflect those that travel into London by car from outside London, e.g. commuters. This data is not available.
 - The pilot was run predominantly during the third COVID national lockdown when there were fewer drivers on the road and drivers were more likely to be driving for work purposes, rather than any other reason.
- 18. The GLA Projections estimate the ethnic background of Londoners in 2021 to be:

White British	37.8%
White Other	18.0%
Asian	19.1%
Black	13.5%
Dual Heritage	5.8%
Other	5.8%

Discussion

Data analysis

19. A total of **7556** stops were recorded throughout the pilot. This breaks down as:

Week 1	January	1866
Week 2	February	1404
Week 3	March	982
Week 4	April	1371
Week 5	May	802
Week 6	June	1122


Ethnicity of driver

20. The data was collected as the 16+ Self Defined Ethnicity (SDE) codes but has been aggregated in line with standard UK government ethnic groupings. Data has been combined to enhance analysis, due to the low numbers of drivers stopped in some groups and also to ensure no individual driver can be identified.

For the full SDE breakdown please see Appendix B.

The breakdown of ethnicity of drivers stopped during the pilot is:

	No. of stops	% of stops	GLA Population Projection
Asian	1515	20.1%	19.1%
Black	1246	16.5%	13.5%
Dual Heritage	160	2.1%	5.8%
Not recorded	323	4.3%	
Other	336	4.4%	5.8%
White British	2229	29.5%	37.8%
White Other	1747	23.1%	18.0%
Total	7556		% may not add due to rounding.




- 21. Around 53% of drivers stopped during the pilot were White British or White Other which aligns closely with the projections which estimate 55% of Londoners are White.
- 22. However when broken down by White British and White Other, 30% of drivers stopped were White British. This is lower than the projections of 38% of Londoners being White British. This is contrasted in 23% of drivers stopped being White Other which only 18% of Londoners identify as.
- 23. This may be in part due to Covid which meant a higher proportion of vehicles on the road were commercial vehicles rather than private vehicles; therefore drivers of these had a higher chance of being stopped during this period.
- 24. In relation to Black and Asian drivers stopped, there was no clear difference between the proportion of stops recorded on the pilot and the projections. Drivers of all Dual Heritage backgrounds and all other backgrounds were stopped less frequently than would be expected from the population projection.

25. Around 4% of drivers had no ethnic background recorded. This was predominantly recorded as due to the driver declining to provide their ethnicity. To overcome this 'officer defined ethnicity' was added to the data capture form in the last two months of the pilot.

Sex of driver

26. When considering breakdown of sex, 86.4% of drivers stopped were male and 13.5% were female¹. This is notable given that the population of London is almost equally split between males and females.

	% of stops	% of Londoners
Female	13.9%	50.2%
Male	86.9%	49.8%



Age of driver

- 27. Driver age was captured in the pilot. For the first 4 months exact age was captured. However following feedback from pilot participants this was changed to age bands for May and June for ease of form completion.
- 28. From January to April the average age of drivers stopped was:


	Average Age
Asian	36.6 yrs
Black	36.9 yrs
White British	38.5 yrs
White Other	36.4 yrs

^{10.1%} of drivers stopped did not identify as male or female or did not have data recorded

All 36.4 yrs² ethnicities

The January to April data suggests that the age of drivers stopped as part of the pilot is very similar regardless of ethnic background.


29. The overall aggregate age curve for all months of the pilot suggests that the age of drivers stopped is generally consistent regardless of ethnic background. There are no apparent disparities between ethnicities.



² The average age has selected certain ethnic groups for detailed data breakdown; not every ethnic group is individually referenced in this table. All ethnic group average is 36.4yrs and is taken from the age group from all ethnicities.

Time of stop

30. There is a clear peak time of s163 stops between 0700hrs-1100hrs and 1500hrs-1800hrs. Stops are recorded at broadly the same time regardless of ethnicity of driver. The overall aggregate curve shows a clear peak time of s163 stops.



Reason for stop

- 31. The reason for stop was only collected from February onwards, following feedback from officers taking part in the pilot. ANPR records are drawn from intelligence records including data sets such as the Gangs Violence Matrix. 'Other' refers to any reason aside from the other 4 listed. This would include stops that are intelligence-led, random document checks or for what may be deemed, suspicious behaviour.
- 32. When broken down by reason for stop, drivers of all ethnicities are broadly likely to be stopped at the same rate across all reasons for stop. There are very slight differences, i.e. White drivers are slightly less likely to be stopped for a road traffic offence than any other ethnicity. However differences are minimal and there is insufficient data to draw any firm conclusions as to why this is.

	ANPR – Other	ANPR – PNC Action Report	Moving road traffic offence	Road Traffic Collision	Other
Asian	1				
	1%	2%	82%	13%	3%
Black	2%	1%	84%	11%	2%
Mixed (Dual H.)	3%	1%	81%	13%	3%
Other	1%	1%	84%	10%	4%
Unknown	1%	5%	81%	11%	2%
White British	2%	1%	77%	19%	2%
White Other	2%	2%	76%	18%	3%

Reason for stop by ethnic background

Note: Data from February 2021 onwards only



Outcome of stops


- 33. The outcome of a stop was only collected in May and June, following feedback from officers taking part in the pilot. Officers were able to select as many outcomes as required, e.g. if a stop resulted in a positive search³ and a traffic report.
- 34. Again there are very slight differences in some outcomes for example those from Dual Heritage backgrounds are less likely to be reported for a traffic offence

³ A positive search is where criminality is detected, whether related to the stop or otherwise.

and more likely to have no further action taken against them. However, again there is insufficient data to draw conclusions on this.

35. Regardless of ethnic background, generally between 70-80% of drivers tend to be reported for a traffic offence and between 15-20% have no further action taken against them.

	Arrest	Community Resolution	No Further Action	Penalty Notice / Process	Stop and Search: Positive	Stop and Search: Negative	Traffic Offence Report
Asian	1%	1%	18%	5%	0%	1%	74%
Black	4%	1%	18%	6%	1%	2%	70%
Mixed							
(Dual H.)	3%	0%	26%	8%	0%	3%	62%
Other	1%	0%	12%	8%	0%	0%	79%
Unknown	3%	0%	16%	13%	0%	0%	69%
White	1%	0%	21%	5%	0%	1%	71%



Impact of pilot on Roads Policing proactivity

- 36. Although the recording of s163 stops has been previously trialled in the MPS, this was last done in the early 2000s. As such there is no control group or data set to compare to the pilot weeks and identify if there has been an impact on proactivity.
- 37. Roads Policing Teams submit returns that record all proactive activity they undertake; these are called 'DDT Returns' and are collated on a weekly basis. These include Traffic Offence Report's (TORs), arrests, stop searches, vehicle seizures and community resolutions. There was no differentiation between an arrest for a "serious

offence" and one for a "minor offence"⁴. Returns are self-reported and have not been checked for accuracy. These returns are the best way of identifying the pilot's impact on proactivity.

- 38. 27 weeks of returns were collated which included the first 4 weeks of the pilot. Three of the pilot weeks had similar numbers of returns and were higher than the 27-week average. Pilot Week 4 had a lower than average return, but only very slightly.
- 39. The data suggests that the pilot had no noticeable impact on Roads Policing proactivity.

	Total Roads Policing DDT Return
Pilot Week 1 – w/c 18 th Jan	1865
Pilot Week 2 – w/c 15 th Feb	1817
Pilot Week 3 – w/c 15 th	1890
Pilot Week 4 - w/c 12 th Apr	1727
27-week average return	1735
27-week median return	1798

Feedback from Roads Policing officers

- 40. Officers who took part in the pilot were invited to complete a short survey to share their feedback. There were 92 respondents across all 4 garages.
- 41. Around 90% of officers believed that the pilot added to their workload; however only 25% believed that this was 'significant'. 82% found the processes for recording stops to be 'simple'. 14% of officers stated that the s163 pilot made it less likely that they would stop a vehicle. No respondents stated it made them more likely to stop a vehicle and the remaining 86% of respondents said it did not impact their decision.
- 42. Around 86% of officers believed that the pilot should not be rolled out permanently across the MPS. 11% were unsure if the pilot should be rolled out and only 3% believed it should be rolled out permanently.
- 43. There were 54 officers who filled in free text comments to make recommendations for the future or offer further feedback. Feedback was almost all negative towards the pilot. Only one response was positive.

44. The key themes were:

⁴ The legislation underpinning arrest, whether for a serious or other offence, is detailed under s24 PACE and can be found at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/24

- They did not understand the premise of the pilot as in most cases they cannot see
 who is driving a vehicle until it has been stopped. They also feared being unfairly
 challenged because they were stopping too many people from a certain ethnicity
 when they were simply doing their job and enforcing road traffic laws.
- The requirements of the pilot were time-consuming, particularly if they did a larger number of vehicle stops in the shift and when relying on their tablet to record them. The tablet can be slow to load which adds to completion time.
- The e-form should be kept as simple and easy to use as possible especially for use on mobile devices.
- When completing an electronic traffic report (TOR) the pilot was a duplication of effort, as self-defined ethnicity is already captured on these reports.
- Some drivers were resentful of being asked their ethnicity they could not see how their ethnic origin was relevant to being stopped while driving.

Implications

- 45. This pilot may have an impact on non-RTPC officer proactivity around traffic stops. When considering proactivity it must be noted that the main purpose of Roads Policing officers is to reduce death and serious injury on the London's road, primarily through stopping vehicles. Therefore it is unlikely that an enhanced recording requirement would reduce the number of vehicles that Roads Policing officers stop. While this pilot had no apparent effect on proactivity it cannot be said that this will be replicated in other MPS teams, whose primary purpose is not road traffic law enforcement.
- 46. Any further roll out of the pilot *may* produce varying results in relation to disproportionality, as non-RTPC officers' use of the power will not have a direct correlation with traffic law enforcement. As a result, the Met will benefit from having a clear response and position on any difference.
- Also, the Met will benefit from a clear narrative, as to why they support this power in its current state, or otherwise, and what action, if any, it will take to address any concerns (fair or otherwise) around s163. This approach will assist in securing the trust and confidence of all communities, as there is a transparent and clear rationale for the MPS position and also ensure that officers are confident in the use of the power.
- 47. This pilot may not address, now or in the future, the belief by many that the MPS does not police consistently for all ethnic groups. An FOIA request from 'Vice' in relation to escooter enforcement activity was managed by DMC in early August 2021. The data has been reported by Vice, as indicating there is disproportionality in the

enforcement of escooter legislation by the MPS.⁵ An ongoing internal MPS challenge, as noted in other areas of ethnicity data analysis, is the limited ethnicity data recorded in key MPS systems. This is subject to recommendation in other DCDG reports, but includes ensuring ethnicity fields are mandatory where a subject is known.

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⁵ https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx5kbz/black-people-using-e-scooters-disproportionatelytargeted-by-police-in-london

Options – SWOT analysis

Option 1 – Conclude pilot and maintain current position

Strengths	Weaknesses
No unacceptable disproportionality	RPTC focus is on road and traffic
shown in pilot.	enforcement, with around 80% of stops
Action completed in response to Mayor's	linked to traffic offences.
Action Plan.	Limited exploration of discretionary use
	beyond RTPC and whether
Clearly positions MPS in its approach as	
currently stands.	unacceptable disproportionality does
	exist.
	Does not address any other findings (sex
	and age demographics).
<u>Opportunities</u>	<u>Threats</u>
Allows MPS assertion of no	May be asserted that use of RTPC was
disproportionality in use of s163 RTA	selected by MPS to reduce likelihood of
powers, as a result of pilot.	unacceptable disproportionality.
Allows MPS to highlight the	Contrary to recommendations of key
inappropriate linking by critics of s1	strategic partners (HMICFRS, Mayor of
PACE stop and search powers with s163	London).
RTA powers of stopping only.	
Data can be used to launch campaign in	
relation to traffic offending of males in	
their middle 30's.	

Strengths

Ensures the MPS explores all potential unacceptable disproportionality in s163 RTA use.

Allows publication of data, but commits to ensuring position is wider across the MPS.

Weaknesses

Data does show that there is no unacceptable disproportionality in use of s163 RTA in RTPC, so extending is counterintuitive.

Delays reporting on action within the Mayor's Action Plan.

Further data capture can be seen by the MPS, at senior levels, not supporting officers' position as unbiased in their use of powers.

Requires support from further pilot sites, which may detract or dilute other policing activity and messages.

Impact on proactivity not fully explored (noting the current reported reductions seen in PACE stop and search levels).

Opportunities

Allows MPS to explore fully, across the organisation, whether there is any unacceptable disproportionality.

Allows MPS to highlight the inappropriate linking by critics of s1 PACE stop and search powers with s163 RTA powers of stopping only.

Data can be used to launch campaign in relation to traffic offending of males in their middle 30's.

Threats

Disproportionality is identified in other B/OCUs that counters current position and requires explanation.

Requirement for ongoing financial and staffing commitment to extend pilot.

Option 3 - Roll out pilot across MPS as business as usual

Strengths

Criticism from HMICFRS and Mayor of London addressed by rolling out pilot as business as usual.

Process for recording established within the pilot and can be used for MPS roll out.

Weaknesses

Impact on proactivity not fully explored (noting the current reported reductions seen in PACE stop and search levels). Significant investment in change programme, delivery and monitoring required, to ensure compliance.

Opportunities

MPS communications can highlight significant changes made following criticism of current practice.

MPS can highlight current lack of unacceptable disproportionality found in pilot, in all communications.

Threats

Disproportionality is identified in other B/OCUs that counters current position, which requires explanation.

Requirement for ongoing financial and staffing commitment to extend pilot.

Appendix A – Final version of the e-form

- 1. Date of stop [entered via clickable calendar]
- 2. Time of stop [select hour-long band]
- 3. Borough of stop [select from list]
- 4. Street name/location of stop [free text]
- 5. Gender [select from list]
- 6. Self-defined ethnicity [select from list]
- 7. Officer-defined ethnicity [select from list]
- 8. Age of driver [select from age banding]
- 9. Type of vehicle [select one from list]
 - a. Bicycle / e-bicycle
 - b. Bus / coach
 - c. Car
 - d. E-scooter
 - e. HGV/LGV/Lorry
 - f. Motorcycle / moped / P2W / quadbike / ATV
 - g. Van
 - h. Other [free text]
- 10. Circumstance of stop [select one from list]
 - a. ANPR PNC Action Report
 - b. ANPR Other
 - c. Moving Road Traffic Offence
 - d. Road Traffic Collision
 - e. Other
- 11. Outcome of stop [select all that apply from list]
 - a. Arrest
 - b. Community resolution
 - c. No further action / words of advice
 - d. PCR/PND
 - e. Stop and search (negative)
 - f. Stop and search (positive)
 - g. Traffic Offence Report

Appendix B - Full breakdown of data by Self-Defined Ethnicity^a

Self-defined ethnicity	No. of stops	% of stops
A1 - Indian	421	5.6%
A2 - Pakistani	236	3.1%
A3 - Bangladeshi	175	2.3%
A9 - Any other Asian		
background	683	9.0%
B1 - Caribbean	298	3.9%
B2 - African	470	6.2%
B9 - Any other Black		
background	478	6.3%
M1 - White & Black Caribbean	28	0.4%
M2 - White and Black African	10	0.1%
M3 - White and Asian	17	0.2%
M9 - Any other Mixed		
background	105	1.4%
N1 - Officer's presence is		
urgently required elsewhere	34	0.4%
N2 - Situation involving public		
order	7	0.1%
N3 - Person does not		
understand what is required	63	0.8%
N4 - Person declines to define		
their ethnicity	232	3.1%
C1 - Chinese	52	0.7%
C9 - Any other ethnic group	271	3.6%
W1 - British	2229	29.5%
W2 - Irish	96	1.3%
W9 Any other White		
background	1651	21.9%
TOTAL	7556	

¹ The standard grouping referenced in Paragraph 20 is by first letter of the above table, e.g. A, B, etc.

Appendix C – Additional information requested at DCDG Steering Group 21/09/2021

Action recorded at DCDG Steering Group: 'Determine what % of vehicle stops result in a stop and search of the
person(s)in the vehicle. Calculate the time it takes to fill in the form designed for use in vehicle stops, multiplied by the
volume of vehicle stops the MPS carry out each year, with a view to being able to show how many officer hours P/A will be
taken up as a result of the this requirement if it is introduced.'

Dip Sample of S&S to identify use of s163 RTA powers prior to S&S

- 1. In order to assess the conversion of s163 RTA use to stop and search powers, the two reviews below were completed by PC Name REDACTED (DCDG). However, it must be noted that there is **no requirement to record s163 RTA stops and therefore base data for vehicle stops is not readily available.**⁷
 - Review of RTPC data for last two pilot weeks (when S&S as an outcome was specifically available to be recorded)
 - Review of 50 S&S Crimint reports on SN BCU between 15/09/2021 and 29/09/2021 (to ensure a BCU perspective)
- 2. RTPC data from pilot weeks in May and June 2021 (when S&S an outcome option)



Total number of s163 RTA stops = 1924

Total number of recorded S&S within those s163 RTA stops = 5/1924 (0.25%)

Total number of arrests (which may include a S&S, but the arrest is the primary recorded element by RTPC officer) = 29/1924

Total number of community resolutions (which may include a S&S, but the arrest is the primary recorded element by RTPC officer) = 4/1924

⁷ There is the potential to consider all PNC checks on vehicles from the MPS, as an indication of all vehicle stops. This has not been undertaken at this stage, but if required can be reviewed for feasibility.

3. SN BCU - data from 15/09/2021 to 29/09/2021



Total number of S&S in review period = 3058

Total number of *filtered* S&S in review period (only includes reports where a vehicle was referenced in the report) = 79/305 (25% of S&S reports appear to have a vehicle linked to them)

Total number of *filtered* S&S assessed in review period = 50/79 S&S *dip sampled* reports where use of s163 RTA was explicit or implied = 14/50 (28%)

S&S *dip sampled* reports where use of s163 RTA could *not* be established = 5/50 (10%)

4. The assessment from this limited dip sample is that on a BCU, 25% of all S&S reports have links to a vehicle and between 28% (greatest reliability) and 90% (lowest reliability) of those S&S reports where a vehicle is recorded, originate from the use of s163 RTA power.

On RTPC between 0.25% (greatest reliability) and 2% (lowest reliability) of S&S reports originate from the use of a s163 RTA power, noting that the numbers and percentage of S&S on RTPC is far lower than a BCU.

⁸ For comparison, the latest MPS dashboard figures for S&S on SN are for the month of August 2021 = 1864 S&S. Therefore, this does seem to be a lower number of S&S records in the review period.

Time to complete the DCDG designed form to record ethnicity in a s163 RTA stop

5. The working assumption is that officers complete the questions on the form, at the time, when the person is stopped. Therefore, based on an assessment of opening and closing of the s163 RTA form on RTPC officers' tablets, the range of completion times was 10 seconds to 15 minutes, but the **standard time taken was 2 minutes**.

Implication for MPS on staffing for completion of the s163 RTA form

- 6. The data below is assessed as the **minimum implication on officer time pan-MPS**, as there is no requirement to record a vehicle stop under s163 RTA (please see footnote 3 above for further research options). The **actual implication must be noted as potentially far higher**.
- 7. Calculations for officer hours required to complete s163 RTA ethnicity data form (based on professional judgement, with rationale recorded below this table).

SN BCU baseline per annum (pa)	BCU x 12 pa	MO8 RTPC (average of pilot x 52) pa	MO7 (50% of BCU baseline)	Rest of MPS (equal to BCU baseline) pa
2,080 (40 per week with a vehicle reference)	24,960	100,048	1,040	2,080
Total for MPS	128,128 per ar	nnum		
Time taken for form = 2 minutes per form		256,256 i 4,271 l	AL (MINIMUM) minutes pa nours pa pa (8 hours)	

8. Rationale:

SN Baseline = Number of BCU S&S records assessed as linked to s163 RTA stops (will be the absolute minimum, as not all s163 RTA stops lead to S&S)

BCU x 12 = SN baseline x 12

MO8 average = Number of s163 RTA stops on average from week long pilot x 52 for per annum figure

MO7 = 50% of SN baseline, as many MO7 S&S may not originate from s163 RTA stops (professional judgement is that they may be less likely to be stopping vehicles) Rest of MPS = 50% of SN baseline and will include VCTF and other pan-London commands/units